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Sensible Atoms:  
A Techno-aesthetic Approach to Representation 
 
Sacha Loeve* 
 
 
Abstract. This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical 
approach rather than with an epistemological critique. For this aim, I propose a ‘techno-
aesthetical’ approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform the logic 
of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike 
critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist 
philosophy, the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut 
distinction between image-as-representation and other modes of existence of images, such as 
the one of ‘imaginaction’ that I draw from a comparison between far-field and near-field 
microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished from representation, I focus 
on nanotechnological percepts and argue that they follow a transmodal logic. I then draw the 
implications of this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that changes the way we 
think of non-living objects. Finally, I conclude that if techno-aesthetics dares to posit and 
articulate sensibility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it simulta-
neously engages us to consider the political character of our responsibilities towards the 
design of nano-engineered sensorial spaces. 
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0. Introduction 
 
We cannot see or feel or hear the single atoms. Our hypotheses with regard to them 
differ widely from the immediate findings of our gross sense organs and cannot be 
put to the test of direct inspection. (…) If it were not so, if we were organisms so 
sensitive that a single atom, or even a few atoms, could make a perceptible impres-
sion on our senses—Heavens, what would life be like! To stress one point: an or-
ganism of that kind would most certainly not be capable of developing the kind of 
orderly thought which, after passing through a long sequence of earlier stages, ulti-
mately results in forming, among many other ideas, the idea of an atom. 
 
Erwin Schrödinger, What is life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell ([60]: 8–9) 
 
These days, seeing atoms has become surprisingly common. While atomic 
landscapes and molecular machines are almost part of our familiar world, this 
quote from Schrödinger reminds us how challenging it is to make sense of this 
situation. 
 
0.1. Imaging, Imagining and Representing  
The troublesome status of nano-images has been witnessed by an intense amount 
of cross-disciplinary scholarship. Despite the wide diversity of approaches 
regarding the various meanings of nano-images, the field has mostly been 
structured by an epistemological critique of these images. Yet this approach has 
led to privileging one prevalent way of conceiving the relationships between 
‘imaging’ and ‘imagining’ over others: The less epistemic credit is given to 
‘imaging’ (as referring to the production of images from nanotechnology as a 
milieu of instrumentation and nanoscale objects), the more the artistic, rhetorical, 
fictional or ideological ‘imagining’ function of nano-images is emphasized—and 
vice-versa. Either the alleged cognitive function of nano-images is undermined in 
favour of their imaginative function; or the evocative power of these images is 
submitted to an epistemological critique, denouncing the strategies of make-
believe that play on likeness with common perception. Critical epistemology 
leads to the conclusion that a scanning tunneling microscope (STM) image does 
not really represent what it pretends to represent. It should therefore be considered 
as a ‘heuristic imagining’ or as an ‘extended metaphor’, but not as an image, that 
is, ‘a genuine and realistic representation of what is really there’ [54]. With nano-
images, everything happens as if, when questioned in the name of truth, they 
always answer by lying in some way. 
The main reason for this puzzling situation is a lack of philosophical ques-
tioning over the meaning of representation and its becoming in nanotechnological 
practices. The epistemological critique of nano-images takes for granted that 
imaging must be a means to faithfully represent nature, and that other things 
should be referred to as ‘imaginings’ that serve a variety of non-epistemic 
purposes (promotional, metaphorical, political, ideological, etc.). Actually, the 
real concern of critical epistemology here is a normative one: it is to safeguard a 
certain image of science and of its authority as an activity that must remain 
guided by a theoretical ideal of faithfully representing nature rather than by some 
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 3 
technoscientific stances on redesigning our life-world.1 The epistemological critic 
of nano-images is moved by the apprehension than one loses all definition of what 
a ‘good science’ is. And the risk, some argue, is one of a general distrust of 
science by the public. 
I do not deny the importance of these matters. But I want to take another di-
rection regarding them: First, claiming that faithful representation of nature is no 
longer the main epistemic value of imaging practices in nanotechnology does not 
ipso facto disqualify their epistemic value.2 It may redefine it. Then, acknowledg-
ing that faithful representation of nature is no longer the exclusive business of 
scientific practice does not endorse a disqualification of the notion of representa-
tion itself. Rather, it may reinforce the notion of representation on a political 
level, by allowing our various partnerships with things, objects, materials, 
machines, and other non-human beings to be politically represented [40]. 
Moreover, the claim that nano-images do not represent what they pretend to 
because they cannot possibly show how a nanoscale object is ‘really’ like, takes 
for granted the old metaphysical distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities (i.e.: essential properties of matter as opposed to their macroscopic 
appearance). There is an ontological background that is implicitly taken as self-
evident here. Indeed, it has been stressed that since nanoscale objects and 
structures are situated below the limit of light diffraction3, they should be 
considered as not only imperceptible—i.e., unobservable because they are too 
small or too remote—but as ontologically invisible [11]. At the nanoscale, we are 
thus supposedly entering the realm of 17th century philosophers’ primary quali-
ties, the way things are in themselves, independently of us. For 17th century 
philosophers, the primary qualities such as bulk, figure, number, quantity and 
motion were meant to be out of reach for the senses, but nevertheless fully 
knowable by representation, unlike the subjective secondary qualities such as 
taste, smell, colour, taste, odour, sounds, texture, and affective tones. Primary 
qualities cannot be sensed, and are themselves insensible.4 They just are as they 
are. And if they ‘look like’ something, they thus look like their intellectual 
representations in the mind, not like their sensible representations, which are ideas 
                                                 
1
 By ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt), I refer to the Husserlian notion of our ways of being in the world as 
that which is self-evident, given, and where ‘living-together’ takes place, prior to any scientific 
explanation of it. 
2
 Tore Birkeland and Roger Strand [9] argue that nano-images are to be considered as real 
‘images’ provided that we understand ‘image’ in terms of information about some processes and 
properties that matter in certain contexts rather than in terms of representation. David Goodsell 
[29] makes a similar argument. As to Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison [18], they claim that the 
visual culture of nanotech has discarded the ideal of faithful representation in favour of another 
one, that they call ‘right manufacture’. But they do not tell whether or not the ideal of ‘right 
manufacture’ entails epistemic values besides engineering and artistic values. 
3
 The Rayleigh criterion states that two points can be separated only if the distance between them 
is greater than half of the wavelength used to resolve their position. The smallest wavelength of 
the visible light spectrum is 400 nm (violet). The resolution of standard optical microscopy is thus 
limited to 200 nm. 
4
 Note that Lucretius already stated that ‘even those things that we perceive to be sensible are 
produced (…) from insensible elements’ ([44]: 860). 
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of how we feel when affected by things, not of how things are.5 Of course, the 
philosophy of Kant has expelled primary qualities out of the knowable realm by 
discarding any possibility of intellectual intuition. The way things are in them-
selves can only be thought, but not known: The real stand irremediably far away 
and the laws of nature are nothing but the laws of phenomenal representation. But 
now, by depicting nanoscale objects as familiar and ‘before-the-hand’ objects 
with recognizable shapes, colours, foreground and background, nanotechnology 
seems to mark the return of the knowledge of primary qualities… under the form 
of secondary ones! Undoubtedly, nano-images cause trouble in the categories of 
representational epistemology. Instead of denying any epistemic robustness to 
these images in order to ‘save’ representation, I want to ask if nanotechnological 
images could better be understood outside the conceptual framework of represen-
tation. The approach I propose towards this aim is a techno-aesthetic one. 
 
0.2. Towards a Techno-aesthetic Approach: Assembling Philosophical Tools 
What I call ‘techno-aesthetics’ is an enquiry into the way instruments and 
machines transform the intrinsic logic of the sensible and not just the way by 
which the sensible represents something else. It focuses on the functioning and 
production of images rather than on images considered as fixed givens. Philoso-
phically speaking, techno-aesthetics is a pragmatic and provisory construction that 
takes as its point of departure Alexander Baumgarten’s notion of ‘aesthetics’ as 
‘sensible knowledge’ revisited with some philosophies that reject the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities and which consider the sensible as being 
rather than as a representation: Henri Bergson’s conceptualization of ‘images in 
themselves’ and ‘perception into things’ [7], Gilbert Simondon’s own techno-
aesthetic attempt [62], Gilles Deleuze’s ‘logic of sensation’, and Alfred North 
Whitehead’s non-anthropocentric account of perception as ‘prehension’, that is, 
any process by which an entity grasps, excludes, enlists the data, registers the 
presence of, responds to, or is affected by, another entity [69]. 
The outmoded and now quite unusual sense of ‘aesthetics’ I chose to draw 
upon corresponds to the meaning of the term when coined by Baumgarten from 
the Greek s (‘aisthesis’, sensation): ‘the science of how something is to be 
cognized sensitively’ ([4]: §115), or ‘the art of thinking analogous to reason (…), 
the science of sensual cognition’ ([5]: §1). Somewhere in the midst between 
Leibniz’s and Wolff’s rationalism and the nascent romanticism, Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics intended in the first place to be a general theory of sensible knowledge 
and, thereafter, a set of considerations on fine arts [33]. 
Against Kant’s twofold reduction of aesthetics to 1) passive receptivity fur-
nishing its materials to intellectual knowledge (in the Critique of Pure Reason) 
and 2) contemplation of a disinterested subject (in the Critique of Judgment),6 it is 
                                                 
5
 This was Locke’s point: only ideas of primary qualities are true resemblances; ideas of secondary 
ones are not. Ideas of primary qualities resemble the real qualities in the bodies, whereas ideas of 
the secondary ones are only modifications of the primary qualities with regard to our own 
complexion ([42]: VIII §§ 9–21). 
6
 Baumgarten’s attempt was indeed promptly dismissed by Kant as ‘the disappointed hope (…) of 
subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles or reason, and so of elevating its rules to a 
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 5 
another ‘romantic rationalist’, Deleuze, who once noticed how ‘It is strange that 
aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be 
represented in the sensible’, since for him, ‘Aesthetics (…) truly becomes an 
apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which 
can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible’ ([20]: 56–57). Though Deleuze 
did not even mention his name, Baumgarten awarded to the sensible an entire 
logic of its own, a logic ‘of the sensible’—and not of the ‘empirical’, since the 
former, contrary to the latter, is not to be subjected to a transcendental double. To 
Baumgarten, indeed, Aesthetica is not a derivative or a weakened form of 
intellectual knowledge, but ‘logic’s younger sister’ (Baumgarten [5]: §13): 
Aesthetica has both a genetic relation to Logica and a life of ‘her’ own. While 
intellectual knowledge proceeds distinctly, sensibility is the faculty of knowing 
confusedly. But confusion does not mean absence of clarity (i.e., obscurity). 
Sensible knowledge has its own kind of clarity: a ‘confused clarity’, whose 
degrees of perfection are not to be situated on the same hierarchical scale as 
distinct clarity.7 Artistic productions, then, are held by Baumgarten to constitute 
affirmations of ‘the confused’ elevated to its higher degree of clarity, on the scale 
of values proper to sensible cognition, and nothing like a translation of material 
things or intelligible ideas in the sensible. Despite the anthropocentric flavour of 
Baumgarten’s metaphysics, it can be stressed that he construes the sensible as 
being both the subject and object of aesthetics: epistemological, i.e., a way of 
knowing, and ontological, i.e., that which is known, the ‘being of the sensible’, 
and not the appearance of what is understood as ‘what can be represented’.8 
                                                                                                                                     
science’ ([38]: 22n)—a rather harsh dismissal allowing the same Kant to hijack the term 
‘aesthetic’ in order to refer: 1) in the Critique of Pure Reason, to that which remains in sensibility 
(Sinnlichkeit) when isolated and abstracted from all knowledge and conceptual representations, 
that is, the pure a priori form of empiric intuition or receptivity (i.e. Euclidian space and linear 
time), in which all phenomena are given and then submitted to the jurisdiction of understanding 
(Verstand); 2) in the Critique of Judgement [39], to the feelings that constitute judgments of 
beauty and the sublime, said to be ‘aesthetic judgments’ as they are grounded neither in one’s 
objective knowledge nor in one’s interest for the existence of an object regarding its capacity to 
satisfy one’s needs or interests, but only on the sort of ‘superior’ and disinterested pleasure (and 
pain, concerning the sublime) provided by the pure presence of the object as a representation of 
the subject (and concerning the sublime, by the feeling of its impossible full presence and partial 
withdrawal from representation). 
7
 Leibniz already distinguished between absence of clarity and lack of distinction. At the lowest 
level are the obscure and subconscious ‘petites perceptions’, for which we have no concept and 
cannot recognize any object. Then, apperception, which is clear and conscious, divides itself into 
confused and distinct. In clear but confused apperception the object is associated with a multitude 
of features that we cannot list separately by recognising distinctive ‘marks’ (notae) allowing the 
object’s properties to be distinguished. Then, clear and distinct apperceptions, are in turn 
inadequate (incomplete) or adequate (complete), as well as symbolic (mediated by artificial signs) 
or intuitive. The complete and intuitive apperceptions constitute the intelligence of God. 
Baumgarten was not so much calling for a rupture with all epistemological hierarchy as he was 
claiming that there is more than only one kind of epistemological hierarchy and that, conse-
quently, the ‘clear and confused’ kind of cognition is capable of an intrinsic kind of perfection 
[45]. 
8
 As Leyla Haferkamp [32] notices, this even makes Baumgarten a compelling predecessor of 
Deleuze’s own transcendental empiricism as a ‘logic of sense’ aligned on a ‘logic of sensation’. 
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 6 
The main interest of Baumgarten’s Aesthetica for our enquiry concerning the 
logic of the nanotechnological sensible lies in the fact that he did not set apart the 
epistemic—‘imaging’—and the aesthetic—‘imagining’—, but attempted instead 
to unite them in a cognitio sensitiva that differs from a theory-driven kind of 
knowledge. 
It is Simondon who envisioned the foundation of a techno-aesthetics in a let-
ter to Jacques Derrida [62]. Though fascinating, the letter is mostly an accumula-
tion of examples: From Le Corbusier to electricity, to the Mona Lisa’s smile, to 
the E V12 Jaguar’s motor. However, Giovanni Carrozzini [15] has highlighted 
some salient features of the letter that mark a shift from Simondon’s earlier 
considerations on the aesthetical dimensions of technical objects [61]. The focus 
of attention is no longer an aesthetic experience of technology or an aesthetic 
discourse on technology, but a cognitio sensitiva that proceeds from and within 
technological schemes, materials, and processes. The late techno-aesthetics of 
Simondon is thus nothing like a disinterested contemplation of the pure presence 
of things in a subject maintaining their functionality at respectful distance. ‘The 
techno-aesthetic feeling seems to be a category more primitive than the aesthetic 
feeling alone where the technical aspect is only being considered from a function-
alist angle, which is impoverishing’ ([62]: 18–19). Such a feeling ranges over a 
large spectrum where pure productive technical experience (making things) and 
pure contemplative experience (praising the presence of something) are only 
limit-cases. It shows an expanded attention oriented towards intrinsic operations 
and allures that do not fully appear. A ‘technical analysis of La Joconde’ Simon-
don writes, would stress the absence of ‘the complete chain of the smile’ and 
decode ‘the mystery itself of the non-appearance’ ([62]: 11). Even if Simondon 
might have left his techno-aesthetics mostly unfinished, he developed an interest-
ing way to think of images in a course of psychology on ‘Imagination and 
invention’ [63]. To him images have a life of their own and are only in part 
dependant on the subject. His method is to follow the genesis of images step by 
step by focusing on the way they ‘haunt’ subjects or detach themselves and get 
embodied in objects of art or technology, along chains of transformation including 
animals’ tropisms, anticipations of actions, simulacra, toys, fineries, symbols, 
machines, etc. He methodically avoids situating image-production’s origin in an 
already constituted subject in relation with an already constituted objective world. 
He also expresses a strong disagreement with Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of 
imagination as ‘unrealization’ [58]. Instead, he analyses imagination in the light 
of invention realizing worldly things. 
What will follow is an attempt to characterize nanotechnological images in 
terms of the intrinsic logic of the sensible they display. Three main lines are 
investigated: I first argue that understanding the production of nano-images 
entails shifting from the conceptual and practical space of representation into 
another one, which I call ‘imaginaction’ together with Bernard Stiegler [64].9 To 
substantiate this claim, I lean especially on a comparison between far-field and 
near-field microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished from 
                                                 
9
 See note 15 below. 
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 7 
representation, I then focus on the logic of nanotechnological percepts: I charac-
terize them as being essentially transmodal. Finally, I draw the implications of 
this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that may reconfigure our 
relationships with non-living objects. 
 
1. From Representation to Imaginaction 
 
Though it may be right in a certain sense, it is not enough to claim that nanotech-
nologies consist in an instrumentation that renders sensible the insensible. The 
originality of nanotechnologies is not that they produce representations of the 
invisible, but that what they produce are not representations. 
 
1.1. Regime of Representation 
Since the rise of modern science, our world has been populated with visible 
representations of invisible entities/properties/processes. 
Consider, for instance, the principle of inertia: it states that a body perseveres 
in its motion without being subjected to force. Yet one cannot naturally observe it. 
Mere empiric observation rather leads one to the adverse theory of impetus. 
Inertia can nonetheless be represented in equations (Newton’s first law) and be 
rendered visible in experiments that ‘reconstruct’ it with forces of opposite 
vectors neutralizing each other. To give another example: As Gaston Bachelard 
explains, on the basis of everyday use and observation, we have long believed that 
in order to produce light one has to burn something, conflating in that light 
emission and combustion [1]. Today, we distinguish between the electromagnetic 
phenomenon ‘light’ and the chemical reaction ‘combustion’. Invisible as it may 
be, this distinction has yet been rendered utterly visible since Edison invented the 
light bulb, for it produces light by avoiding a heated resistance to burn. 
Representation goes along with a sense of distance that is essential to it. Dis-
tance, first of all, in scientific judgment, critical distance: a representation is 
about something that is not the representation itself; it cannot be purely equated to 
the objects it attempts to represent, which cannot be considered as being fully 
given in the representation. As Wittgenstein limpidly put it, ‘objects I can only 
name. Signs represent them. I can only speak of them. I cannot assert them. A 
proposition10 can only say how a thing is11 not what it is’ ([71]: 3.221). The real 
that is represented stands far away. It is never perfectly knowable. Only indirectly 
can it be known, reconstructed in a space of artificial signs, which Alfred 
Nordmann calls ‘artful constructions of immediacy’ [50]. Such ‘immediacy’ is 
not a feature of the whole representation, but only of its points of contact with the 
distant real. The virtue of representations is to construct an aboutness-relation that 
clearly specifies the conditions of an immediate agreement with the mediated and 
distant reality. A representative picture is ‘like a scale applied to reality’ ([71]: 
2.1512) in which ‘only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the 
object that is to be measured’ ([71]: 2.15121). Termed ‘co-ordinations’, they ‘are 
                                                 
10
 i.e., to Wittgenstein: a ‘logical picture’ of a ‘state of affairs’. 
11
 i.e., what ‘is the case’ or what is not (a fact). 
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 8 
as it were the feelers of its12 elements with which the picture touches reality’ 
([71]: 3.1515). And these co-ordinations have nothing to do with resemblance. As 
Michel Foucault put it, representation is ‘the dissociation of the sign and resem-
blance’ ([25]: 70). A defining character of representations is that they require the 
construction of a scene where natural phenomena are re-enacted and even 
artificially produced in such a way that representations are in principle distin-
guishable from the technical means displayed to construct them. They re-present 
nature. The scientific explanation is to be inserted in this space between the 
objective scene of representation and the awareness of its constructive operations. 
It is because the real stands in the distance and is in principle separable from the 
instrumentation that allows its objectification that the scientific discourse is able 
to criticize its own representations in the name of faithfulness to the real. 
It is important to understand that representation does not necessarily mean 
‘realism’. For the realist, the representation is ‘true’ because the sign refers to a 
state of affairs that is independent from it (as the primary qualities for the early 
moderns). For the anti-realist (or the empiricist) the representation is ‘nothing 
more than a representation’: it cannot be granted the mysterious power to go out 
of itself13; it refers to unobservable entities from which nothing can be ontologi-
cally asserted in the end14. Note that for the anti-realist, this does not preclude the 
representation to be convenient, or even true independently of what humans think 
and do, suffices it that different types of measures are correlated with sufficient 
predictive power. The point is that such a debate between realists and anti-realists 
can only take place in the regime of representation.15 
In the regime of representation, the sensible is cleaved in two: first, it is what 
‘presents itself’, mainly a source of ‘epistemological obstacles’ which has to be 
criticized by an appropriate ‘psychoanalysis of objective knowledge’ [2]. 
Thereafter, a ‘sublimated’ sensible is produced in the form of phenomena 
bringing into light that which never solely presents itself. To Bachelard, the laws 
of Joule and the light bulb met in the electrified world of Edison, which is akin to 
a ‘second nature’ over and above the merely empirical one. 
 
1.2. Apparatuses of Representation 
The classical entities/processes/properties of modern science and the nano-objects 
are both invisible and rendered visible to humans by means of instrumentation. 
                                                 
12
 i.e., the picture. 
13
 Wittgenstein avoided this difficulty by stating that the sign which make up the logical picture is 
also a fact, and thus, that a relation of co-ordination is nothing more than a relation between two 
facts. 
14
 Bas van Fraasen is, by today, the most distinguished advocate of this tradition [66]. 
15
 See the interesting attempt of Otávio Bueno. He develops an account of visual evidence as ‘the 
result of some partial mappings between the surface and the image of the sample, so that certain 
relations among the items in the sample are preserved and represented in the image’. This partial 
matching is of course inferred, and sometimes with the help of ‘the theoretical image that was 
used as a guide in the elaboration of the experiment’, which is experienced as resembling the 
experimental image ([13]: 134–135). Bueno argues that ‘both realists and empiricists can adopt the 
account’ ([13]: 137). However, he explicitly put that such a debate between realism and empiri-
cism becomes merely a matter of more or less and not a matter of interpretative clash. 
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Therefore invisibility cannot serve as a distinctive feature of nano-objects here. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that atoms were already accessible to imaging 
before the spread of nanotech (Fig. 1). 
Accordingly, the problem is not thus that atoms are now instrumentally ac-
cessible to imaging and imagining. It is the way by which atoms are now rendered 
sensible and the concept of this sensibility that differ. As Karen Barad points out, 
if ‘atoms aren’t what they used to be’, this is not only because our philosophical 
conceptions, scientific theories and representations of ‘the’ atom have changed 
since Democritus, and then, since the mechanical age of physics, but rather 
because ‘our practices of imaging and imagining and intra-acting with them have 
changed, and so have we’ ([3]: 353–354). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Imaging atoms and molecules before nanotechnology: a Field ion microscope (FIM) image 
of tungsten atoms on the apex of a tungsten tip. Erwin W. Müller, [48]. The operation runs as 
follows: A sharp tip is placed under vacuum and cooled down at cryogenic temperatures. An 
intense positive voltage is applied to the tip. A small amount of inert gas (such as helium or neon) 
is admitted in the vacuum chamber. The gas atoms move toward the tip and strike it. Being 
positively charged, the tip atoms tends to take electrons from the gas atoms, leaving them 
positively ionised. Once positively charged, the gas ions are violently repelled from the tip and 
accelerated by the electric field along a straight line toward a fluorescent screen. Each spot is the 
trace of a ion showing ‘where it comes from’, i.e.: from the immediate vicinity of the atom where 
it has been ionised. The gas used is called the ‘imaging gas’. 
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b Field emission microscope (FEM) image of copper phthalocyanine molecules adsorbed on a 
tungsten tip. Erwin W. Müller, [48], from Joachim & Plévert ([37]: 103). The FEM is akin to a 
FIM without imaging gas: a strong field effect causes electrons to be expelled from the tip and 
projected on the screen, so as electrons can image some of the fragments deposited on the tip by 
passing through them. c Transmission electron microscope (TEM) image of a copper phthalocya-
nine crystal. H. Hashimoto, Tokyo University, 1974, from Joachim & Plévert ([37]: 105). d 
Scanning transmission electron microscopy (STEM) of a micro-crystallite of uranium. Scale bar: 
20Å ([68]: 4). e STEM images of atomic clusters and single atoms (smaller spots) in Brownian 
motion as shown by Albert V. Crewe (1927–2009) in The Invisible World (1979), a National 
Geographic documentary. Note that A. Crewe claims to having established the visibility of single 
heavy atoms by STEM since 1970 [17]. 
 
Now if we were to meditate about a functioning scheme of any far-field mi-
croscope (Fig. 2), we would see that they all bear some family resemblance: a 
certain radiation (optical, electronic, ionic, X-ray, infrared, etc.) is emitted, 
focused through a set of lenses (whether optical or magnetic, as in the case of 
electronic microscopy), interacting with a sample, by which it is transmitted 
and/or diffracted. Subsequently, a trace of this interaction projects itself in the 
eye, on a screen, or is recorded by a detector. The result is not necessarily an 
image that is meant to resemble the object; it can be a curve, a spectrum, etc. In 
far-field techniques, the notion of distance is somewhat materially present in the 
instrument. So is the notion of screening. One can find all sorts of filters and grids 
in far-field microscopes. For instance, Low-energy electron diffraction methods 
(LEED) display a set of grids blocking the inelastic electrons and letting the 
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elastically scattered electrons pass through; one obtains a pattern of diffraction on 
a fluorescent screen. One also uses a lot of mathematical mediations. For instance, 
the Fourier transform allows matching a diffraction pattern with the determination 
of the arrangement of atoms predicted by the theory, and thus to co-ordinate 
experience and theory by an isomorphic relation between their respective points 
of contact. The apparatus sorts out the data according to the plan of intelligibility 
chosen to study the phenomenon (a specific range of properties). It performs a 
test. The sense of the critical distance that defines the epistemic values of 
representation is also made possible by the distance that the technical apparatus 
and the mathematical mediations introduce between the representation and the 
real. 
 
               a                                 b                         c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Schematic diagrams of some far-field microscopes: a Visible light microscope. b 
Transmission electron microscope (TEM). c Scanning electron microscope (SEM). 
 
1.3. Apparatuses of Imaginaction 
How different is this process in near-field microscopy! With the scanning 
tunneling microscope (STM) and its innumerable avatars, ‘imaging’ is no more a 
matter of sending a radiation and gathering a trace from the distance. Instead, it is 
a dialogue that takes place down at the level of the object and its immediate 
surroundings—including the atomic-level part of the instrument (the apex of the 
tip).  
Imagine yourself using a STM: you go fetch the information in the near field, 
approach the object, touch it, feel it, brush it. Scanning at constant height, the 
STM records how its piezoelectric mechanism reacts, flinches and swishes, under 
the effect of a tiny short-circuit (or leaking junction) between the sample and the 
tip, and topographic images are generated from these data. Now, switch from 
‘imaging mode’ (STM as an instrument) to ‘manipulating mode’ at constant 
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current (STM as a tool): contact the object, kick it, pulse it, record its electronic 
‘answer’. Now be creative, and invent other manipulation modes as well (Fig. 3). 
Or tune the device and run it in a ‘semi-imaging’ mode: use the STM-xenon atom 
system as both a tool and instrument that will ‘self-image’ its own operation         
(Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 3 STM as a tool: Some STM manipulation modes. Courtesy of Andrew Mayne, Laboratoire 
de Photophysique Moléculaire, CNRS, University of Paris-Sud, Orsay, France. 
 
 
Fig. 4 STM-object system in semi-
imaging manipulation mode: Image 
of an individual xenon atom when 
pushed from left to right of the 
frame during scanning along the Y 
direction. The grey scale Z 
indicates the variation of the tip-
surface distance [10]. Usually, 
imaging and manipulating with an 
STM are mutually exclusive modes 
of operation, with the STM 
switching back and forth between 
imaging and manipulating. Here, the 
parameters hae been chosen so as 
the STM does both imaging and 
manipulating in the same time. The 
STM-xenon atom system ‘self-
images’ its own operation. The 
distance between representing and 
modifying has entirely collapsed. 
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Now use not only the STM as a tool but the object too—for instance, a naphtha-
lene ‘Lander’ that acts as a movable template to ‘mould’ the surface (Fig. 5).  
 
Fig. 5 STM-object system as a tool-tool system: Sequence of naphthalene ‘Lander’ molecules 
manipulated from a step edge on a copper-(110) surface [57]. From a to d, the arrows indicate 
manipulation direction; the circles mark the modifications induced by the manipulated molecules 
on the surface step edge (tooth-like structures); e uses an image optimization processing to 
emphasize the fact that the metallic nanostructures created by the STM-Lander system follow one 
axis in the crystalline orientation of the copper-(110) surface. This phenomenon is explained as 
follows: During their displacement, the molecular ‘Landers’ are trapping some copper adatoms 
lying on the surface under their polyaromatic backbone. Once they cross a step edge, the 
molecules drop these atoms on the downward terrace along the direction of the copper rows.  
Researchers speak of ‘molecular moulding’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 STM-object system as a tool-
instrument system: Here, a similar 
naphthalene ‘Lander’ molecule is ele-
ctrically connected to a step edge. a is a 
schematic view, b the experimental STM 
image, and c a simulation of the ex-
periment showing standing wave patterns 
[47]. This simple system allows measuring 
something that could never have been 
measured otherwise: the electronic con-
ductance of a single molecular wire 
connected to a definite point of an atomic 
surface. For the narration of this experi-
ment, see Joachim & Plévert ([37]: 59–61). 
Later on, this experimental system has 
evolved toward a slightly more sophisti-
cated one: an Ampere-meter at the 
molecular scale. 
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Now switch from ‘tool-tool’ system to ‘tool-instrument’ system: Place the same 
molecular ‘Lander’ in electronic contact with a step edge of the surface and 
measure the resistance of the molecular wire thereof obtained (Fig. 6). It is as if 
you were within the sample, on the surface, with the molecule as an Ampere-
meter, except that one electrode is at the nanoscale and the other at the macro-
scale. Or else, as in the ‘manipulated atom image’ experiment, trap the cobalt 
atom under the electrostatic field of the tip to have it part of the imaging system; 
now, scan the sample and have a glimpse of ‘how it feels like’ to be a cobalt atom 
on a copper-(111) surface (Fig. 7): produce unseen (or unheard) physical feelings 
with ‘prehensions of prehensions’ [69]; allow the STM to ‘prenhend’ a cobalt 
atom so as it will produce an image of how the same cobalt atom ‘prehends’ the 
copper surface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Feeling like a cobalt atom on a copper-(111) surface: A ‘manipulated atom image’ [65]. 
What is shown here are not copper atoms. It is the way a single cobalt atom trapped in the 
electrostatic field of the STM tip explores a copper-(111) surface by random motion: large 
‘bumps’ correspond to the zones explored by the cobalt atom when the tip is situated above a face-
centered cubic site of the copper-(111) crystal, small ‘triangles’, to the zones explored by cobalt 
when the tip is above a close packed site; dark zones are where the cobalt is not likely to stay 
(above copper atoms). The overall image is like a cartography of a copper-(111) surface as ‘seen’ 
by a cobalt atom—a rather rough cartography; listening to atoms reveals far more tenuous events 
occurring, as documented in Stroscio and Celotta [65]. 
 
Could we not delocalize scientific instruments directly at the nanoscale? This is 
part of Christian Joachim’s dream: ‘writing a new textbook in which each of the 
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old devices is replaced by a single molecule, which becomes simultaneously the 
experimental apparatus and the subject of experiment’ ([37]: 59). 
All this illustrates how nanotech plays with the lines between experimental 
system/technical object, technical object/epistemic thing [56], observing 
/manipulating, imaging/imagining, instrument/tool, instrument/object, 
knower/known, and even subject/object, that is, with all the fault-lines defining 
scientific representation. If they are not dissolved, at least they are each time 
displaced, short-circuited and reconstructed in specific setups, from which they 
re-emerge as movable polarities. Even Hacking’s notion of ‘intervening’ [31] 
would be far too shy here. For not only does the STM interact with the sample (as 
all microscopes somehow do); nor does it only ‘interfere’: it ‘intra-acts’ and 
‘enacts the between’ ([3]: 359). 
 
1.4. Regime of Imaginaction 
Constructing a distant picture of nature—representing—is no more the problem. 
For probe microscopists, ‘explaining’ the cognitive meaning of the image means 
accounting for the tightest interaction between the image and the object. As 
Gimzewski relates, ‘traditional scientists shunned this method because its 
intimacy was seen as a violation of objectivity and distance, a gospel of 19th-
century science and epistemology’ ([26]:260). It is still knowledge, but a knowl-
edge that is inseparable even in principle from the technological apparatus used to 
perform it. As Otávio Bueno notice, a scanning probe image is not only object-
oriented, it is also experience-oriented, ‘it is also about what it is like to perceive 
DNA (…) from the perspective of an atomic force microscope’ ([13]: 134). Yes, 
experience-oriented indeed, but not necessarily human-experience-oriented. The 
subject of experiment is as much the AFM cantilever than the DNA; or better, it is 
the way they in4teract  
Nanoscientists are definitely more interested in the singular way by which a 
singular object interacts with the instrumental tool than in the universal laws that 
classically define an object qua object of science. An STM image of an iron atom 
is not an instantiation of a general class of atoms: it is a relief of an object situated 
in a particular environment, according to a certain interaction (Coulomb force, 
magnetic force, electronic tunnelling, etc.) at the surface of the object, with 
particular imaging settings, or produced as this surface; it is a particular surface of 
interaction and control, or a surface of affordance, a surface affording definite 
modes of interaction, or affording an ‘object-image’, enacted in-between. In probe 
microscopy, the image enacts and witnesses a tight communication between 
scales that is already a possible action on the object (even before the discovery of 
the STM’s ability to manipulate single atoms). This is why I use the term 
‘imaginaction’ coined by Stiegler to refer to this regime of images.16 
                                                 
16
 The concept of ‘imaginaction’ has surfaced in the course of a common work with Bernard 
Stiegler and Xavier Guchet, during a three-year seminar on nanotechnology hosted by the Institute 
of Research and Innovation at the Centre Pompidou of Paris (http://www.iri.centrepompidou.fr/ 
evenement/nano technologies/). But the term ‘imaginaction’ is Stiegler’s [64]. He coined it in a 
workshop we co-organized on ‘hyperminiaturization’ by referring to what I was calling ‘ima-
gotechnology’. I was using this latter term in two ways: 1) in a narrow sense, to denote the 
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2. Transmodality 
 
2.1. Touching things 
The primacy of touch over sight has been emphasized by many probe micro-
scopists [8, 27]. In addition to probe microscopy, there are other elements that 
allow asserting the primacy of touch in the nano-realm: optical or magnetic 
tweezers used to grab proteins and measure the forces of molecular motors [14]; 
nanotribology, the science of textures and friction at the nanoscale [6]; and 
molecular recognition, a mutual ‘prehension’ [69] that the chemist Jean-Marie 
Lehn describes as molecules processing information by touching each other [41]. 
For sure, sight is the privileged sense of reference for the epistemologies of 
representation, for which objectivity is often conceived as ‘blind sight’ ([18]: 17) 
and scientific image as the product of ‘mind’s eye’ ([18]: 86, 168). Sight is 
supposedly the sense of distance whereas touch is the one of immediateness and 
pure contact—which is not entirely true: touch calls to tact, that is the insertion of 
a minimal distance in a situation of promiscuity, potential violence and lack of 
distinction17. Whatever it may be, focusing on the ‘epistemology of the finger’—
as some focus on the ‘epistemology of the eye’ [18]—would be restricting our 
analysis to the phenomenological part of nano-images only. Instead, it may be 
more fitting to emphasize the transmodal character of these images themselves. 
Transmodality, here, means capturing what is given in one perceptive modality to 
express it into another: from sight to touch, from touch to audition, etc. Or, like 
Deleuze commenting on Bacon’s painting put it, ‘how to paint sound, or even a 
scream? And conversely, how to make colors audible?’ ([21]: 57). 
If ‘transmodality’ is a suitable concept for characterizing the logic of the sen-
sible performed by nano-images, it can then account for the alleged primacy of 
                                                                                                                                     
apparatuses that do not produce images of a distant object but that include the object’s operation in 
their production so that the manipulation of the object and the production of an image are one and 
the same process. Imagotechnology refers to the production of what I have called elsewhere 
‘image-objects’. 2) In a broader and seemingly more metaphoric sense, ‘imagotechnology’ refers 
to new ways of ‘imagining matter’ or to a ‘technology of imagination’ that is shaping the aesthetic 
mode into which our relationship with materiality is framed. However it is not purely metaphoric 
because it entails a particular ‘schematism’—a Kantian concept that will be made use of and 
explicated below—which is technologically constructed and enacted, and which imposes a certain 
configuration to the relations between sensory modalities (visibility, tangibility, audibility…) as 
well as to the relations between the percept or logic of the sensible and the concept or logic of 
sense. One way to differentiate between the two concepts might be to say that ‘imagotechnology’ 
designates the material setup that produces an ‘imaginaction’. But I want to avoid referring the 
former to the object (or to ‘imaging’) and the later to the subject (or to ‘imagining’), as what 
interests me instead is the interweaving of the technical and the conceptual. For that reason, 
‘imaginaction’ can more aptly be construed as a partial, disparate and dynamic conjunction of 1) 
and 2). 
17
 As Derrida [24] recalls, many taboos are expressed as a principle of ‘don’t touch!’…or rather, 
‘do not touch too much’—a half-permissive taboo underlining the need to insert the minimal 
distance of tact in the relation between the feeler and the felt; and a reversible relation since touch 
is also where what phenomenology calls ‘self-affection’ first stems: one is always ‘touching-
touched’ before becoming ‘seeing-visible’ and ‘hearing-oneself-speak’. Touching can be caressing 
as well as hitting. In order to allow the emergence of awareness of the world and of the others, 
touch has to be measured. 
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touch: indeed, more than any other sense, touch has a transmodal character. For 
Jean-Luc Nancy ([49]: 17) ‘touch is nothing other than the touch of sense 
altogether and of all the senses. It is their sensuality as such’. By touch, all the 
senses are substitutable to each other. Touch is where all senses impinge on each 
other… touch each other. This explains, Nancy remarks, why there is no genre of 
art specifically dedicated to touch. Following Nancy, Derrida [24] undertakes to 
show that behind the apparent privilege of sight in philosophy as the sense of 
distance and contemplation lays an old haptocentric tradition that awards privilege 
to touch precisely in order to dispute the legitimacy of any hierarchies between 
the senses. But let’s go back to nanotech images themselves. 
 
2.2. Images beyond vision 
Scanning a piece of mica with an AFM, you obtain these very nice pictures (Fig. 
8). But the raw data is not the picture itself: it is the curve below, expressing how 
the AFM ‘feels’ the mica in terms of variations of amplitude versus frequency of 
its cantilever’s vibrations during lateral scans. The picture is just a visual display 
obtained by a digital ‘collage’ of all the lateral curves of scanning. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Listening to the stones: Fast scanning of hydrofluoric acid-etched mica by AFM. Retrieved 
May 14, 2011 from http://www.asylumresearch.com/Gallery/Movies/Movie15.shtml 
 
But who says that you have to set the system to deliver visual depictions? You 
can use a haptic interface that will send a force feedback to your hand, which 
enables you to touch or to scratch the mica as the tip’s apex of the cantilever does. 
You can use sound as well, turning your AFM into a kind of phonograph, and 
listen to the mica.  
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Using the AFM to listen to cells has been reported by Gimzewski and co-
workers [28]—a practice that they have labelled ‘sonocytology’. It notably 
allowed them to study the differentiations of cancer cells from healthy cells 
during the evolution of a tumour. The method has also led to a collaboration with 
the media artist Victoria Vesna for the exhibition Cell Ghosts at Seoul in 2004. 
The installation, where images of the visitor are captured, projected in particles’ 
images, and reappearing later as ghosts, also includes ambient sounds composed 
of data obtained by manipulating living cells [67]. We can thus hear how a cell is 
‘singing’ when it is gently brushed by the AFM, then manipulated, then subjected 
to chemical or temperature changes, and finally, succumbs to the deadly touch of 
the AFM18 (which recalls the connection between touch and violence in its most 
straightforward form). Of course, cells do not sing, but they undergo specific 
changes in their wall’s vibrations which could be rendered with sound better than 
with images to provide a real-time account of the rate of molecular events inside 
the cell. 
By means of this process, we understand that displaying probe microscopy 
data in sound is neither more nor less ‘artificial’ than making images from 
spectrums’ lines—and therein that the meaning of such images is not reducible to 
the depiction of their visual display, or to any of the features that are displayed in 
only one determined sensorial modality (audition, touch, etc.). Nano-images are 
not primarily visual or haptic or audible, etc. They are essentially transmodal. 
 
2.3. Transmodality Across Scales 
Transmodality is certainly not specific to the nanoscale. At our scale, a lot of 
things can of course equally be seen, touched, tasted, heard, and smelled—but this 
is multimodality, not transmodality. Transmodality is nothing paranormal, 
although we usually do not notice it. It is experienced in everyday life when one is 
reading aloud a written text, executing a musical partition or visualising musical 
tones and frequencies. Transmodality relies on the use of media, whose operations 
are often a matter of translating a sensory modality into another or at another 
scale.  
Nevertheless, at our scale, the transmodal character of percepts induced by 
media technologies is much of the time obscured. The way we usually refer to 
things is mostly constrained by vision, perhaps because it allows pointing at 
things from a distance (‘look at this!’). Moreover, the assignment of sensorial 
qualities (e.g. the redness) to sensorial modalities (e.g. the sight) is therein mostly 
monomodal. We do not know intuitively how the sound of the redness sounds 
like. If perceiving the same object through different modalities (i.e. multimodal-
ity) goes without saying, shifting from one modality to another does not. Yet our 
machines allow for it: These are indeed the transducers of everyday life, from tape 
heads to loudspeakers, to piezoelectric crystals (an essential component of the 
STM too), to antennas, to television’s cathode ray tubes, etc.  
                                                 
18
 To listening cells ‘singing’ go to http://www.darksideofcell.info/composition.html 
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Accordingly, the pertinent difference is not between monomodality at our 
scale and transmodality at the nanoscale. It is rather that transmodality is less 
constrained by monomodality at the nanoscale: it shows itself unbounded, in its 
‘free state’. It can thereafter be captured, transduced and displayed into a multi-
plicity of perceptual modalities with apparatuses such as probe microscopes. 
Note that I am not claiming that transmodal percepts are real whereas 
monomodal perceptions would be mere illusion. Instead, I entirely follow 
Whitehead in his rejection of the ‘bifurcation of nature’ between primary and 
secondary qualities, when he writes that ‘the red glow of the sunset should be as 
much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of 
science would explain the phenomenon. It is for natural philosophy to analyse 
how these various elements of nature are connected’ ([70]: II). At our scale, 
transmodal percepts are between monomodal percepts, and require machines to be 
experienced, operated and made thinkable. At the nanoscale, transmodality is the 
rule rather than the exception, as there are only inorganic and machine-like 
percepts at the bottom. 
 
2.4. Schematism 
If transmodality is the rule rather that the exception in the nano-realm, it neces-
sary goes with technological procedures governing the way transmodal percepts 
are displayed into determined perceptive modalities. This set of operations can be 
referred to ‘schematism’ in the sense of the Kantian philosophy of knowledge—
though in a way that Kant would never have agreed with, since it is not about a 
‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ ([38]: 181), but about a hidden art in 
the depths of the technical apparatuses of nanotechnologies. 
According to Kant, schematisation is the procedure of imagination allowing 
to sensibilize the conceptual and conceptualize the sensible. It is that which 
allows one to draw a mathematical figure (a triangle) or to manipulate symbols 
(e.g., to make an addition) and, conversely, to recognise a concept (a triangle) into 
a sensible intuition. A scheme is both a procedure of construction and a procedure 
of recognition. To Kant, any scheme has to be an abstract procedure, not a 
concrete image. For if Kantian schematism is performed by imagination, the 
faculty of producing and reproducing images, it is only under the jurisdiction of 
understanding, the faculty of abstract concepts. 
If nanotechnologies entail a schematism, it functions in a different way. 
Unlike Kant’s, it is less a mediation between the sensible and the conceptual (with 
imagination bridging the two), than a mediation between the sensible and the 
sensible, mediated by the computational. It can be putted by the following 
sequence, highlighted by the semiologist Patrick Pajon [52]: 
 
‘Detect-Compute-Display’ 
 
An example can be provided by relating the way probe microscopists recog-
nise a peculiar specimen, here a ‘molecular wheelbarrow’ (Fig. 9).  
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Fig. 9 Detecting-computing-displaying a 
molecular wheelbarrow: a Experimental 
STM image (‘blind image’); b ‘calculated 
image’; c comparison of experimental 
and calculated height profiles along the 
‘wheel’ axis; d ‘visual-friendly image’ 
(Molecular Mechanics chemical model); 
e ‘anticipated image’. Source: Nano-
science Group at CEMES-CNRS, 
Toulouse, France. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9a is a numerical collage of -height curves of a molecule adsorbed on a 
surface. STMers name this image the ‘experimental image’. It is an image 
obtained by detection, a ‘blind’ image. This first image is then computed into 
quantitative data by means of a program devised in the lab. The software uses 
several theories (quantum conductance through an organic molecule and theoreti-
cal chemistry) and semi-empiric methods of approximation to compute the 
experimental image according to other data (molecular orbitals coordinates, 
interaction potentials of the surface, and imaging conditions). It allows for the 
generation of a ‘calculated image’ (figure 9b). Then, the experimental and the 
calculated image are compared (see the two -height curves on figure 9c). 
Sometimes, this comparison is done by the mediation of a so-called ‘anticipated 
image’ that shows how the experimental image would look like according to 
parameters that are well-defined by the theory.19 If they are assumed to be 
matching, the calculated image will finally be displayed in a ‘visual-friendly’ way 
                                                 
19
 It is this image that Bueno [13] calls ‘theoretical image’. 
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(here: a Molecular Mechanics chemical model, figure 9d) allowing one to 
‘visualize’ the interpretation (here: the conformation taken by the ‘molecular 
wheelbarrow’ when adsorbed on the surface). As we saw it, the calculated image 
can also possibly be displayed in a haptic or a sonorous modality. And it is also 
possible to look or listen to the experimental picture directly, but it would be—
and most of the time, it is—hard to interpret. The cognitive interpretation of the 
image (‘what do we see?’ ‘What do we hear?’) is generally occurring at the level 
of the calculated image, because it is the level where the image gives grasp to the 
theory (not immediately, but by the mediation of some associated softwares to 
produce ‘anticipated images’). All this is a very mediated and complicated 
process. The reason for this may be that, paradoxically, the price to pay for the 
shrinking of distance is a renouncement to the ‘artful constructions of immediacy’ 
[50]. 
What is first detected by scanning probe apparatuses are neither ‘primary 
qualities’ (intelligible features that exist ‘in themselves’ independently of any 
perceiver), nor ‘secondary qualities’ (pure subjective impressions that exist only 
‘for us’). It is a kind of nonhuman sensitivity enabled by devices whose operation 
is to put different scales and different sensorial modalities in communication.  
 
3. A New Sensible Condition 
 
If one can talk about haptic or auditive as well as visual images, and if nano-
images are essentially transmodal, on what ground are we to assert that a trans-
modal percept is still an image, even before being seen, heard, or touched, that is, 
transduced into an image-sound, an image-touch, image-vision, etc.? If there are 
only machine-like percepts at the bottom, are we still talking about the sensible? 
And what does it mean to perceive like a machine? Does it even mean something? 
Of course, these puzzling questions matter as far as one is willing to go be-
yond the bare fact that these nano-images are given on a paper print or on a 
computer screen, and ask what it means for our sensible condition that they do 
exist in the first place. 
 
3.1. Perception into Things and Images in Themselves 
These difficulties can be addressed by reading the philosophical half a fiction 
staged by Bergson in the first chapter of Matter and Memory [7]. In order to 
investigate the relationship between matter and perception, he proposes a thought 
experiment where one substitutes the perception impregnated with our past with a 
perception ‘confined to the present and absorbed, to the exclusion of all else, in 
the task of moulding itself upon the external object’ ([7]: 24), a ‘pure perception’, 
‘impersonal’, deprived of any memory and withdrawn from all individual 
contingencies. He warns the reader that one never encounters such a ‘pure 
perception’, since our lived present is always mingled with memories and oriented 
towards our possible actions. From our actual perceptions, ‘we then retain only a 
few hints, thus using them merely as “signs” that recall to us former images’ ([7]: 
24). Nevertheless, Bergson seeks to show that ‘the individual accidents are merely 
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grafted on to this impersonal perception, which is at the very root of our knowl-
edge of things’ ([7]: 25). Once memory is withdrawn, perception therefore 
appears not as a shadow above things, not as a mental photography,20 not as a 
representation, but as an operation occurring into things. Perception is neither a 
picture in our mind (‘Idealism’, referred by Bergson to Berkeley), nor a secondary 
quality which does not look like what it represents (‘Realism’, referred to the 
‘mechanical philosophers’ of the 17th century). Who indeed believes, like the 
idealist, says Bergson that things might disappear when I do not perceive them? 
Who believes, like the realist, that the real table is distinct from the perceived 
table? The thought experiment allows Bergson to claim that there is no difference 
of kind between perception and matter, but only a difference of degree, whereas 
there is a difference of kind between perception and memory,21 the latter consti-
tuting the individuated side of our apprehension of things. There is no other 
choice, he then argues, than to posit that the world is composed of images that 
exist ‘in themselves’ and not ‘in us’, even without being perceived.22 These 
images do not disappear once the perceiver is gone. They are less than what the 
realist calls a ‘thing’ and more than what the idealist calls a ‘representation’. They 
are physical interactions existing in themselves, each one constantly acting and 
reacting with all other images according to all the laws of nature (whether known 
or unknown). 
 
‘By positing the material world we assume an aggregate of images, and moreover 
because it is impossible to assume anything else. (…) Reduce matter to atoms in 
motion (…) Condense atoms into centres of force, dissolve them into vortices re-
volving in a continuous fluid (…): they are still images. It is true that an image may 
be without being perceived; it may be present without being represented; and the 
distance between these two terms, presence and representation, seems just to meas-
ure the interval between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter’ ([7]: 
26–27). 
 
What happens then between ‘presence’ and ‘representation’? In other words, 
if for images there is merely a difference of degree, and not of kind, between 
being and being consciously perceived, then what does the perception of the 
image add to the image? Actually, in the perceived image, there is less, and not 
more, than in matter: Perception results therefore from a selection of images and 
not from the addition of a representational dimension. Here is the trick: Bergson 
                                                 
20
 ‘The photography, if photography there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart 
of things and at all the points of space’ ([7]: 31). 
21
 Which is directed controversially against classical empiricism (Hume, Berkeley, etc.), for which 
a memory is only a sensation of less intensity. 
22
 Simondon’s Imagination et invention [63] walks in the footsteps of Bergson’s non-
representational account of images: images do exist even before being perceived; they partake to a 
cycle that begins before us. But whereas Bergson insists on actual perception as a subtraction, a 
cut into the plane of images, Simondon insists on invention as an antidote to proliferation: images 
require our potentials of artistic or technical invention in order to be guided into existence, along 
the lines of a common world. Otherwise, they may formautonomous worlds that catch people like 
dreams do. To Simondon, invention is image-driven, but it also seems to be a way to expel images 
out of ourselves. 
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assumes some images to be slightly different than others in that they insert some 
duration between their stimuli and their reaction on other images and that they 
can react sometimes differently to the same stimulus, whereas all the others 
interact in a fully deterministic and quasi-instantaneous way. These are ‘living 
bodies’, also termed ‘centres of indetermination’. This is the only assumption 
Bergson makes: the existence of indetermination in some nodes of the universe 
(i.e. freedom in the weakest sense possible). These images do not perceive other 
images by representing, but by acting: ‘I call matter the aggregate of images, and 
perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one 
particular image, my body’ ([7]: 8). This latter image-body is disturbing and 
tuning the field of interaction of the others in function of its possible action: The 
image-body acts on and reacts to a second image; and as part of its action it 
responds to some features of the second image while not registering others. Our 
perception is then the measure of our possible action: it results from the discard-
ing of what has no interest for our needs and our functions. Once perceived, the 
images are still the same, only minus the qualities that are irrelevant to the 
perceiver’s action. Amongst all equally real scales of reality, what a perceiving 
agent does is to select a particular ‘frequency’ to interact with some images at the 
scale where it needs to act, just as probe microscopes or other nano-
sensor/actuator devices do. Perception is function of the scale where one under-
takes to act.  
Deprived of memories and without interiority, Bergson’s ‘subject’ of pure 
perception is really an ‘imaginactor’ more than a producer of representations. It 
acts on images and amidst images. Moreover, Bergson’s paradoxical appeal to 
commonsense philosophy in the midst of philosophical fiction relating a situation 
that no one can ever encounter as such, bears undoubtedly some analogy with 
nanotechnology’s affordance of the familiar and the picturesque in the midst of 
the unfamiliar. Scanning probe images are some kinds of ‘images in themselves’ 
that decentre us from our anthropocentric vantage points of perception and action. 
Whether Bergson is right or wrong,23 the breach he has opened up (and promptly 
shut down) in the representational philosophy of perception might be the one 
where nanotechnologies plunge us, with the restriction perhaps that the ‘centres of 
perception and indetermination’ are no longer limited to living bodies but extend 
to inorganic ones as well—thereby rather an enlargement than a restriction of 
Bergson’s account of perception. 
 
3.2. Interobjectivity 
In a number of nanotech manipulations, an electron, a photon, a spin, an atom, a 
molecule, a surface, a nanoparticle, etc…, are not only of interest as objects of 
study bearing interesting properties, but also as potential detectors, sensors, 
probes, actuators, that is to say all that can interact with an entity/object/process at 
the scale where it acts on other entities/objects/processes. This well instantiates 
                                                 
23
 For he himself distinguishes the thought experiment of pure and instantaneous perception from 
the ‘concrete and complex perception—that which is enlarged by memories and always offers a 
certain breadth of duration’ (Bergson [7]: 26). He will then retrace his steps to correct what he 
himself declares to be ‘excessive’ by bringing memory back in again. 
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Whitehead’s idea that all interrelations between ‘actual entities’ should be 
ontologically considered as much real and valuable than the relations between 
those that are classically considered as subjects versus objects [69]. Interobjective 
relations matter. 
Moreover, the way this interobjectivity matters do transform our relationship 
with materiality. In the regime of representation, the subject of knowledge 
elevates himself above the sensible by placing his instruments between represen-
tation and matter. The knower’s relation to the matter of knowledge is placed 
under the sign of verticality. In the regime of imaginaction, our relation with 
materiality becomes horizontal as well. And so becomes the very notion of 
control, omnipresent in the grand narratives of nanotechnology as well as in the 
scientific literature: Control would no longer refer to the sole affirmation of man’s 
power over matter, restricted to the situation of dumb objects in the hands of 
smart engineers. It would rather refer to the instauration of robust relationships of 
co-prehension between nanoscale objects/entities/process, horizontally, and to a 
knowledge gained by partaking in these mutual prehensions. It is it this sense that 
in nanotechnology, control is not the proof of knowledge, but knowledge itself, 
operative knowledge, technological knowledge [43]—which does not mean full 
knowledge or full control in the sense of vertical control; it rather implies a quite 
local and self-limited knowledge, as it can only be complete regarding the 
parameters taken under consideration for locally achieving a particular perform-
ance in a certain milieu. However this does not prevent this technological 
knowledge to look for generic schemes allowing ‘delocalizing’ a phenomenon 
from one kind of environment to another: from low temporature to room tempera-
ture, from vacuum to air, from liquid-phase to surface, from conducting surfaces 
to insulating ones, etc [51]. 
With this notion of interobjectivity, everything happens as if we would be 
gaining some access to the way objects/entities/processes have access to each 
other—to the sensible life of non-living things. Is such thinking more than a vue 
de l’esprit? One might object that only a sentient subject can be called ‘sensitive’. 
If this would be the case, these horizontal relationships—let’s say for instance, 
between a molecule functionalized to ‘sense’ some feature of the surface where it 
is adsorbed, and a STM tip functionalized to ‘probe’ this ‘sensitivity’ itself—
should be referred to as mathematical series instead of anthropomorphic images 
alluring to sensitive objects. The two poles of representation—the ‘purely human’ 
view, and the ‘view from nowhere’—would thus be restored, and everything 
would be back into order. We could indeed do so, but then we would miss the 
meaning of such an experimentation. Moreover, the claim that an object is 
sensitive to another object implies no anthropomorphism, for is not about 
‘projecting’ human sensitivity onto other types of sensitivity. If in the contrary we 
consider seriously such a claim, then we are also to consider that the aesthetic 
question of nanotechnology is not only the question of how it changes our 
sensible condition and our being-in-the-world, but also how it changes the 
sensible condition and being-in-the-world of objects—expressions unacceptable 
for many philosophers, for which an object is only the correlate of a subject, the 
sole sensitive pole. 
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3.3. Inorganic Sensibility 
The logic of the sensible deployed by nanotechnologies is no more a phenome-
nological one, grounded on the relation of man-and-the-world, and this is 
precisely why a techno-aesthetic approach is needed. For many phenomenological 
philosophies, the so-called ‘nanoworld’ would probably not be a world at all since 
there is no room in it for the inscription of the lived body and thus, no being-in-
the-world. There is no flesh at the bottom.24 
As Deleuze and Guattari put it when they dare the phenomenological con-
cept of ‘flesh’ to constitute the being of the sensible and not just the ‘thermome-
ter’ involved in revealing it ([22]: 178–179), 
 
‘This ground, this rhythmic unity if the senses, can be discovered only by going 
beyond the organism. The phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient be-
cause it merely invokes the lived body (…), a paltry thing in comparison with a 
more profound and almost unlivable Power [puissance]. We can seek the unity of 
rhythm only at the point where rhythm itself plunges into chaos, into the night, at 
the point where the differences of level are perpetually and violently mixed’ ([21]: 
44). 
 
To Deleuze and Guattari, these processes are neither sensible nor straight-
forwardly thinkable by themselves even if they might be encountered when one 
gets trapped in what they name a ‘Drug assemblage’: ‘a perceptive line of 
causality that makes it so that (1) the imperceptible is perceived; (2) perception is 
molecular; (3) desire directly invests the perception and the perceived’ ([23]: 
311). To allow molecular processes to be experienced out of a ‘Drug assemblage’ 
without falling into the abyss, one needs to get equipped with adequate instrumen-
tation and sophistically elaborated materials.  
So do nanotechnologies. Against transhumanists, it can be stressed that 
nanotechnologies are not exactly ‘enhancing’ the biological makeup—and herein 
the sensory performances—of the human. Instead, they strive to render livable 
and habitable for humans, the unlivable inorganic depths of the sensible. They 
afford experimental access to a sensible that is not reducible to the modalities of 
the (post-/trans-/super-)human access to it. Like Deleuze’s account of the 
operations of art as a matter of ‘capturing forces’ [21], the operations of 
nanotechnologies are a matter of taking advantage of, playing with, amplifying 
and filtering, the various sorts of processes (electronic, electrostatic, repulsive 
/attractive van der Waals, magnetic, optic, plasmonic, etc.) by which nano-objects 
act, are acted upon, and interact. As suggested by the ‘molecule-Ampere-meter’ 
(Fig. 6) and the ‘manipulated atom image’ (Fig 7) experiments, the ‘rendering 
sensible’ process takes place both ‘vertically’ (between subjects and objects) and 
‘horizontaly’ (between objects). To put it like Whitehead, it is about prehending 
nano-entities in a way analogous to the way they prehend each other [69]—a way 
                                                 
24
 The late Merleau-Ponty grants flesh to be ‘the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to 
Myself’ (Merleau-Ponty [46]: 139), ‘the formative medium of the object and the subject’ 
(Merleau-Ponty [46]: 147). 
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to access the way nano-objects access their environment. As Nathan Brown [12] 
contends, nanotechnologies are challenging less the differences between physical, 
living, and human beings than they are challenging their respective access to the 
world and world-forming powers. Especially, they challenge the Heideggerian 
tripartition between the ‘worldless’ character of the physical thing (the stone), the 
‘poor in world’ character of the living being (the lizard on the stone), and the 
‘world-forming’ character of Dasein (man). For Brown, the world-forming power 
termed by Heidegger ‘the open’ is now attributable to inorganic objects as well, 
for they display an inorganic sensibility to which we can partly access. Nanotech-
nologies question the very confinement of the category of the ‘sensible’ in 
subject-object correlations where only the subjective pole of the correlation is to 
be world-forming and sensible. In nanotechnologies, the object is no more a mere 
correlate of the subject (Gegenstand) in a representation; it becomes, as Brown 
put it, ‘nothing-otherthan-object’.25 The ‘nothing-otherthan-object’ means both 
the mode of existence of the physical being as ‘not without access’ to itself and 
the world, and a threshold condition of ‘openness-towards’ that might pass 
through and between any being (non-living, living, human), and that humans can 
experiment or even become when ceasing to maintain representational relation-
ships with objects. 
While we are becoming sensible to atoms, it is not only our sensible condi-
tion that is affected but also the one of objects. Yet, thereafter, we are to compre-
hend our own sensibility differently, by highlighting the inorganic part of it. 
Indeed, if we are able to desire being the lizard basking in the sun, just as much 
can we desire being the stone heated by sunlight. We do not need to project 
ourselves into the inorganic realm to make such a sensibility thinkable. It just has 
to arise to us. ‘It’s the same story for music, says Deleuze, when it elaborates a 
sonorous material to render audible those forces that are not audible in them-
selves. In music, it’s no longer a matter of an absolute ear but rather an impossible 
ear that can alight on someone, arise briefly in someone’ [19]. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
What if the foremost transformative power of nanotechnologies is neither 
scientific nor industrial, but rather aesthetical? This essay has engaged the 
aesthetical question of nanotech as a question concerning the sensible. Nanotech-
nologies can be characterized by the arising of a new sensible beyond representa-
tion. Or, using the Deleuzian triad of the concept, the percept, and the affect [22], 
we could say that we and the atoms are now forming a different per-
                                                 
25
 Following Graham Harman’s ‘object-oriented philosophy’ [34, 35], Brown’s ‘nothing-
otherthan-object’ also challenges another Heideggerian dichotomy: between ‘thing’ and ‘object’. 
Heidegger was indeed praising the former—the jug or the old bridge [36]—as unveiling the 
ontological structure of the world and disqualifying the former as expressing modern science’s and 
metaphysics’ will to subject the world to categories of representation (substance/properties, 
matter/form, etc.). Nano-objects overcome this dichotomy: a nanomachine for example, is a 
technical object, but also a thing, since its mode of existence is not exhaustible to a conceptual set 
of representations inherent to a specific corpus of science [30]. 
Author-generated postprint of an article published in Nanoethics, vol. 5, n° 2, pp. 203-222 (2011) | Imag(in)ing the Nanoscale, 
Special issue edited by Kamilla KJØLBERG, Rasmus Tor SLAATTELID, and Fern WICKSON | DOI: 10.1007/s11569-011-0124-0 
 
 27 
cept/concept/affect nexus. Concept: imaginaction rather than representation. 
Percept: transmodal rather than unimodal or multimodal. Affect: inorganic rather 
than bio-centered. 
Unlike particle physics or astrophysics, nanotechnologies they do not pro-
duce visible representations of invisible things. They are rather attempting at 
turning an unlivable and transmodal ‘chaosmos’ into a habitable ‘life-world’ 
where we would be able to discern and to act on things in using our usual 
perceptive modalities—a crazy challenge, since there is no flesh at the bottom. 
The problem is not therefore the displacement of the divide between the visible 
and the invisible, it is rather the way this divide is altered from within, ‘enacted in 
between’ ([3]: 359) and reconfigured in terms of inhabiting, in an attempt to bring 
familiarity within the unfamiliar. Each nanotech realization transforms space by 
inhabiting the kind of milieu where it succeeds [51], and it succeeds in a process 
that Simondon calls ‘concretization’ [43, 61], that is, by turning some of the 
constraints of its environment into an ‘associated milieu’, by determining which 
constraints matter and how, by making sense of its environment. 
If, as their promoters claim, nanotechnologies really are to revolutionize our 
everyday life regarding the technologies we use and live with, then I argue that 
this potential is not to be found in the endless list of incredibly useful applications 
that nanotechnologies promise to deliver, but in the way they techno-aesthetically 
transform both our sensible condition and the sensible condition of objects. 
Nanotechnologies are not only a new way of rendering invisible objects sensible 
to humans, but a new way of construing the being of the sensible—not only as a 
sensibility to atoms (epistemological), but also as a sensibility of atoms (ontologi-
cal). Objects are no more mere correlates of a subject as in the relation of 
representation, where the subject is the only sensible pole. Nanotechnologies 
render thinkable and afford experimental access to a sensible that is infinitely 
deeper than the modalities of its human access. Though ways of construing the 
sensible without resorting to the mirror games of representation has been explored 
by certain philosophies—as the ones referred to above—, it has never constituted 
the usual business of a world-wide technology. Here we are now. 
Techno-aesthetics may help us to address issues regarding the social use of 
nanotechnologies in terms of schematisation of transmodality, especially regard-
ing future devices that would integrate sensory-motor access to nanoscale 
processes. Who indeed will choose the perceptive modality in which such or such 
image-process will interfere with the gestures of use? Which kind of common 
space is to arise if it relies on a previous delimitation of perceptive modalities?  
Such issues could be addressed in terms of ‘distribution of the sensible’, ac-
cording to the term of Jacques Rancière, who refers to ‘the system of self-evident 
facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something 
in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions 
within it’ (Rancière [55]: 12). Indeed, by framing the modes of perception and 
enunciation of a common nano-space with delimitations between what is visible 
and invisible, tangible or intangible, sayable and unsayable, audible and inaudible, 
the nano-engineered perceptive spaces also tend towards distributing the roles: 
who will be granted the competences to determine which features of the nano-
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space should be rendered sensible and who will be authorized to talk about it? 
These are social and political questions. 
If a techno-aesthetic approach is one that dares to posit and articulate sensi-
bility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it engages us 
simultaneously to consider the political nature of our responsibilities towards the 
design of nano-engineered perceptive spaces. If nanotechnologies cannot succeed 
but by inhabiting and bringing some familiarity within the unfamiliar, the iconic 
strategies they use—as it is all about images—might also turn out to be counter-
productive, inappropriate and aesthetically impoverishing. Depicting atoms, 
molecules and surfaces as familiar and picturesque objects situated in a space that 
stands ready to be colonised, conceals the collapse of representation and main-
tains instead a poor relationship of adherence to the visual—a relationship to 
which nanotechnologies themselves can help us to get free of. Depicting the 
nanoworld as if it was merely ‘ours’ is a manner of undermining the mode of 
existence of its inhabitants, a way of withdrawing from our relationship with 
nanotech the significance of interobjective relationships, and finally, a way to 
repress the mutation of the sensible described here by attempting to contain it in a 
parody of representation. Yet when asked about ‘artists depictions’ they are fond 
of, very often, researchers answer that ‘it is just a representation’, i.e., the 
phenomena depicted are idealized, etc. But precisely these images are not 
representations since they are using the same likeness and familiarity that has 
always been perceived as a threat against due representations, that which should 
be maintained at distance by both the epistemology and the apparatuses of 
representation. As Marc Pavlopoulos put it [53], these images are not lying 
because they do not represent what they aim at, but because they seem to pretend 
that they are representations. However, calling for a new detachment with regard 
to the aesthetic power of nano-images would be the worst strategy to endorse, as 
it would be the best way to let this small world function unbeknownst to us and 
reconfiguring our ‘life-world’ without us. 
This is where I believe that the practices of artists and art critics might play a 
decisive role, a role that scientific practices of nanotech are perhaps not able to 
play. Indeed, what can be captured in the artistic realizations concerned by 
nanotechnology are the ways in which possible ‘distributions of the sensible’ can 
be set up, given to experiment, and undone; the way in which a certain practice of 
transmodality can go against the instantaneous harnessing of attention by the 
visual and the use of screens in order to lengthen and deepen perception, populate 
the interstices, ‘making strange’ [16, 59]. The valuable contribution of artists 
should not be restricted to the operation of ‘rendering the invisible visible’—as it 
is often claim about nano-art—; instead, it should also seek to rendering intelligi-
ble the way things are rendered sensible, or else, making strange the way things 
are rendered familiar. Artists—or rather, their productions—are also there to 
remind nano-facturers that, despite their grand ambitions regarding the design of 
our common ‘life-world’… they might turn out to be bad artists. 
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